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Abstract
There are several empirical studies that have focused on the analysis of retired 
digital media on the secondary market which has had historical impact on not only 
the technology community, but the business community alike. This research will 
introduce the Digital Forensics Recovery (DFDR) study, where five key 
industries- government, education, businesses, electronic recycle centers, and 
individual home users were targeted to test effectiveness of data sanitization 
practices with used media.  While previous work analyzed any device, the DFDR 
study aims to analyze on media in which due diligence has been taken to ensure 
data privacy
Introduction
Given the migration from paper based storage to digital media, coupled with the 
movement of increased computer based personal and business practices; virtually 
all forms of communication are stored on some type of digital media.  Improper 
data sanitization practices  can result in  the release of confidential data and 
identity theft
• Digital media capacity continues to increase while the cost per GB 
continues to decrease [2].  Toshiba developed a 2.5 terabyte density per 
square inch [16]
•The; shorter replacement lifecycle directly results in a higher number 
discarded digital devices which in turn needs to be sanitized before it is retired or 
reused.  
•Residual data, is data that remains on digital media after a sanitization 
process was taken. It can be found in slack and unallocated space, or could 
simply be marked for deletion but not actually deleted.
•Properly adopted and integrated data sanitization policies and practices are 
essential to ensuring discarded media does not contain personal identifying 
information or sensitive corporate data. Practically all aspects of our lives are 
held on digital media somewhere, whether the media is in our control or not.
•Current beliefs on formatting, f-disking or imaging (aka ghosting or 
cloning), are that these approaches result in properly sanitized digital media; 
however research has shown that residual data can be recovered from these 
drives [3,18]. In special cases, even zero fill utilities can leave residual data in 
slack and unallocated space. 
Accidental Data Disclosure Examples
•In 2009, Chris Ogle purchased a used iPod for $15.00 from a store in New 
Zealand.  The iPod contained current personal information of different military 
personnel, war mission briefings and deployment information. [11]
• In 2002, the US Veterans Administration Medical Center, located in 
Indianapolis, disposed of 139 computer desktop systems.  The systems were 
either sold or donated to needy school districts.  A reporter purchased three of the 
systems. The drives were littered with confidential and personal data including 
medical records on veterans with mental health concerns, AIDS, and other 
serious health ailments [12]. 
•In Garfinkel and Shelat’s research study published in 2003,10 used systems 
were purchased from a computer store which contained files from a law firm, 
records on mental health patients, and confidential financial files [1]
•In 2009, researchers purchased used desktop machines on eBay, the systems 
contained health records and financial records from a major healthcare 
provider.[3] 
Hard Drive Replacement Lifecycle 
DFDR Phase One Results
•Government Drive:
•Two credit cards with CV codes
•Two social security numbers
•Four addresses,
•Dozens of emails
•Hundreds of personal images
•Over 60 profiles, including the domain administrator.  
•The SAM files were recovered and the domain administrator 
account password was cracked using FTK’s PRTK tool. 
•Employees used the computer to process travel reservations, 
•System used by an employee who was updating immigration files –
•All the personal data need to steal two complete identities  was 
recovered. 
•Educational Drive:
•This drive contained enough data to steal three complete identities;
•Countless confidential files, emails, and personnel images were found.   
If released this data could be extremely embarrassing for the 
educational site, even illegal in situations
•Business Drive:
• Employee records, payroll, banking files, confidential internal 
memos, and budget information.
•Tax data- file found on the computer that contained a master record for 
tax and payroll. The full names, addresses, DOB’s, SSN ’s, and 
banking data (direct deposit) was found for 23 employees. 
•Electronic Recycle Site: 
•Photos of an underage teenager participating in illegal drug activities. 
•Homes User
•Confidential  tax data, banking records, personal files, FAFSA forms, 
National Guard Data
Sanitization Tools: Open Source and 
Commercial
There are several options available for both open source and commercial data 
sanitization tools. When selecting a tool, the authors note it is important to select a 
tool that emphasizes patterns in write fill in addition to passes. This is imperative to 
making sure that slack and unallocated space is overwritten. 
and no data was found. 
Who is Responsible? Legal Concerns 
The concerns identified by the DFDR project are twofold, first the lack of 
regard of any sanitization practice whatsoever, and secondly the 
ineffectiveness of f-disk, format, and imaging [1].  
When a computer is formatted, as part of a fresh install of Windows, there is a 
warning that informs the user that all of their data will be erased. If Microsoft is 
stating this, why shouldn’t it be believed by the average user? 
Senate Bill S 1490 has been introduced several times for votes, but has yet
to be signed into law. The bill aims to “To prevent and mitigate identity
theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to
enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other
protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of
personally identifiable information [22].”
House bill H.R. 221 Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009 (DATA),
also aims to provide national coverage for victims of security breaches.
Senate S. 3742 Data Security and Breach Notification Act, S 139, Data
Breach Notification Act, and S 773 Cybersecurity Act of 2009 were also
introduced into Congress in 2009. Passed into law.
Conclusion 
Protect Your Data Yourself!
The DFDR project, which aimed to test sanitized drives only, found that 
those that were sanitized, were rarely done correctly. Digital media was acquired 
and analyzed to determine if one residual data was found, and also to determine if 
any residual data found can be used to steal an identity. The results demonstrated 
that proper data sanitization practices are not a key focus to most users, 
businesses, school districts, and government agencies.  However, this was not 
the case for the electronic recycle center, which had great sanitization 
practices on lose media, but failed to apply the same process to drives internal 
to machines.  
The ease of sanitization tools, such as Boot and Nuke, and their low-cost, if 
not free, should lead to more use of these tools to properly sanitize drives.  The 
researches feel that if more people understood the ineffectiveness of current 
sanitation practices then more users, educational facilities, electronic recycle sites, 
and businesses would adopt proper procedures. 






Tool can be found at 
http://www.dband.sourcefor
ge.net




Erase Free Windows Tool can be found at  
http://eraser.heidi.ie/
Wipe Free Unix Tool can be found at 
http://www.wipe.sourceforg
e.net
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• New HD Purchased
•Organizations purchase HD as singles or in new systems 
•HD’s are implemented into existing or new systems
• HD Integrated into Business or Organization Production
•HD’s are given the organizations “image” to shorten implementation phase
•Confidential and regulated data is stored on HD’s
•HD Upgraded 
•Upgrades include software, operating system, or hardware
•Upgrades could be due to a virus, new technology, or planned upgrades
•HD Sanitized
•Existing confidential and regulated organization data is “sanitized”
•Organizations “sanitize” drives with commonly accepted practices




•HD Reused or Sold
•Old HD is either installed in existing system within the organization or is 
sold on the secondary market
•Drives “sanitized” with commonly accepted practices unknowingly contain 
confidential and  heavily regulated data are either reused or sold
Digital Forensics Data Recovery Project             
Digital media was purchased or acquired through a variety of venues within 
the United States, including government auctions, eBay, craigslist, dumpsters, 
curbs with “free sign”, and data recycle centers. The purchase of the media was 
funded through the National Center for the Protection of the Financial Industry. The 
media, including hard drives and flash drives, was forensically imaged with 
FTK Imager and stored and cataloged on a DROBO.
The Digital Forensics Data Recovery (DFDR) project, however, is focused 
on taking data remanence a step further to analyze residual data on sanitized 
media within the secondary market. Prior research analyzed any discarded media, 
this research aims to acquire drives in which due diligence has been taken to ensure 
data privacy.
